

# **Mark scheme (Results)**

June 2017

Pearson Edexcel International  
Advanced Level in History (WHI04)

Paper 4: International Study with  
Historical Interpretations

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot  
War in Asia, 1945-90

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## General marking guidance

- All candidates must receive the same treatment. Examiners must mark the last candidate in exactly the same way as they mark the first.
- Mark schemes should be applied positively. Candidates must be rewarded for what they have shown they can do rather than penalised for omissions.
- Examiners should mark according to the mark scheme not according to their perception of where the grade boundaries may lie.
- All the marks on the mark scheme are designed to be awarded. Examiners should always award full marks if deserved. Examiners should also be prepared to award zero marks if the candidate's response is not worthy of credit according to the mark scheme.
- When examiners are in doubt regarding the application of the mark scheme to a candidate's response, the team leader must be consulted.
- Crossed-out work should be marked **unless** the candidate has replaced it with an alternative response.

## How to award marks

### Finding the right level

The first stage is to decide which level the answer should be placed in. To do this, use a 'best-fit' approach, deciding which level most closely describes the quality of the answer. Answers can display characteristics from more than one level, and where this happens markers must use their professional judgement to decide which level is most appropriate.

### Placing a mark within a level

After a level has been decided on, the next stage is to decide on the mark within the level. The instructions below tell you how to reward responses within a level. However, where a level has specific guidance about how to place an answer within a level, always follow that guidance.

Markers should be prepared to use the full range of marks available in a level and not restrict marks to the middle. Markers should start at the middle of the level (or the upper-middle mark if there is an even number of marks) and then move the mark up or down to find the best mark. To do this, they should take into account how far the answer meets the requirements of the level:

- If it meets the requirements *fully*, markers should be prepared to award full marks within the level. The top mark in the level is used for answers that are as good as can realistically be expected within that level
- If it only *barely* meets the requirements of the level, markers should consider awarding marks at the bottom of the level. The bottom mark in the level is used for answers that are the weakest that can be expected within that level
- The middle marks of the level are used for answers that have a *reasonable* match to the descriptor. This might represent a balance between some characteristics of the level that are fully met and others that are only barely met.

## Generic Level Descriptors for Paper 4

### Section A

**Target: AO1 (5 marks):** Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

**AO3 (20 marks):** Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	<b>0</b>	No rewardable material.
<b>1</b>	<b>1–4</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Demonstrates only limited comprehension of the extracts, selecting some material relevant to the debate.</li><li>• Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included and presented as information, rather than being linked with the extracts.</li><li>• Judgement on the view is assertive, with little supporting evidence.</li></ul>
<b>2</b>	<b>5–8</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the extracts by describing some points within them that are relevant to the debate.</li><li>• Mostly accurate knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth. It is added to information from the extracts, but mainly to expand on matters of detail or to note some aspects which are not included.</li><li>• A judgement on the view is given with limited support, but the criteria for judgment are left implicit.</li></ul>
<b>3</b>	<b>9–14</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Demonstrates understanding and some analysis of the extracts by selecting and explaining some key points of interpretation they contain and indicating differences.</li><li>• Knowledge of some issues related to the debate is included to link to, or expand, some views given in the extracts.</li><li>• Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and discussion of the extracts is attempted. A judgement is given, although with limited substantiation, and is related to some key points of view in the extracts.</li></ul>
<b>4</b>	<b>15–20</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts, analysing the issues of interpretation raised within them and by a comparison of them.</li><li>• Sufficient knowledge is deployed to explore most of the relevant aspects of the debate, although treatment of some aspects may lack depth. Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge.</li><li>• Valid criteria by which the view can be judged are established and applied and the evidence provided in the extracts discussed in the process of coming to a substantiated overall judgement, although treatment of the extracts may be uneven. Demonstrates understanding that the issues are matters of interpretation.</li></ul>

5	21–25	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interprets the extracts with confidence and discrimination, analysing the issues raised and demonstrating understanding of the basis of arguments offered by both authors.</li> <li>• Sufficient knowledge is precisely selected and deployed to explore fully the matter under debate. Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge when discussing the presented evidence and differing arguments.</li> <li>• A sustained evaluative argument is presented, applying valid criteria and reaching fully substantiated judgements on the views given in both extracts and demonstrating understanding of the nature of historical debate.</li> </ul>
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## Section B

**Target: AO1 (25 marks):** Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	<b>0</b>	No rewardable material.
<b>1</b>	<b>1–4</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic.</li><li>• Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question.</li><li>• The overall judgement is missing or asserted.</li><li>• There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.</li></ul>
<b>2</b>	<b>5–8</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• There is some analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question.</li><li>• Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question.</li><li>• An overall judgement is given but with limited support and the criteria for judgement are left implicit.</li><li>• The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.</li></ul>
<b>3</b>	<b>9–14</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although some mainly-descriptive passages may be included.</li><li>• Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth.</li><li>• Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation.</li><li>• The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence or precision.</li></ul>
<b>4</b>	<b>15–20</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period.</li><li>• Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands.</li><li>• Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported.</li><li>• The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence or precision.</li></ul>

Level	Mark	Descriptor
5	21–25	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis and discussion of the relationships between key features of the period.</li> <li>• Sufficient knowledge is precisely selected and deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands.</li> <li>• Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement.</li> <li>• The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.</li> </ul>

## Section A: Indicative content

### Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945-90

Question	Indicative content
1	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument.</p> <p>Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that China's entry into the Korean War was triggered by US forces invading North Korea in October 1950.</p> <p>In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <p>Extract 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• MacArthur's use of US forces and the extent of his gains north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel in October 1950 threatened the security of the Chinese border.</li><li>• The Chinese had made it clear that if MacArthur's forces moved into North Korea then they would have to respond.</li><li>• China's response was based on the fear that a failure to respond to the presence of US forces in North Korea would encourage US aggression elsewhere in the region.</li><li>• The Chinese perceived MacArthur's use of US forces as the first direct move by the US in a worldwide struggle for power and that they had to act to prevent the outbreak of global conflict.</li></ul> <p>Extract 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• It was Truman's decision to send US troops to Korea in July 1950 which was the origin of China's concern.</li><li>• Mao had predicted that the US military command might not be able to limit their intervention in Korea to just stopping the North Korean attack, and would use the opportunity to try to take control of the North.</li><li>• China made plans to counter-attack if necessary and for the PLA to be ready to fight by August of 1950.</li><li>• The decision to commit Chinese forces merely coincided with the crossing and, in fact, was part of a series of events going back much further.</li></ul> <p>Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that China's entry into the Korean War was triggered by US forces invading North Korea in October 1950. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Chinese forces only entered Korea from mid-October, when the extent of the US presence in North Korea had become clear and MacArthur's troops were approaching the border with China, not in response to the crossing over of the South Korean Army (ROK) in late September.</li><li>• Diplomatic channels, particularly through India, suggested even in September that the Chinese had no great interest in intervening in Korea unless MacArthur's UN forces crossed the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel</li><li>• Mao's final decision to intervene was met with some reluctance by Chinese military commanders and Mao was unable to get a firm agreement from</li></ul>



Question	Indicative content
	<p>the USSR for air support suggesting that it was a direct response to events on the ground rather than part of a long-term plan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>US military intelligence had no direct evidence of a significant Chinese build-up of forces on the Korean border with Manchuria before October</li> </ul> <p>Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that China's entry into the Korean War was triggered by US forces invading North Korea in October 1950. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>China became increasingly concerned over perceived US aggression towards Communist influence in Asia in early-mid 1950 as Truman made belligerent statements with regard to Taiwan, Japan and Manchuria based on state department document NSC 68</li> <li>Mao's reaction to Truman's decision to send troops to Korea in July 1950 was hard-line from the start he believed that the US had launched 'an invasion of Asia'</li> <li>Mao made the first moves towards a military plan of action in July and by August contingency plans had been drawn up; the timing of the attack may have been deliberate to allow the US to over-extend its forces</li> <li>Events in Korea were part of the wider development of a Cold War in which "hotspots" were regularly emerging and to which China was reacting.</li> </ul>

## Section B: Indicative content

### Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945-90

Question	Indicative content
2	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how similar the US policy towards Vietnam was under President Eisenhower to that under President Kennedy.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that US policy towards Vietnam under President Eisenhower and under President Kennedy was similar should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Both Eisenhower and Kennedy believed in the 'domino theory' and that US involvement in South Vietnam was to combat the spread of communism</li><li>• Neither Eisenhower nor Kennedy recognised Ho Chi Minh as a nationalist leader but rather based their policies towards North Vietnam on the assumption he was under the direct control of the USSR and/or China.</li><li>• The Eisenhower and Kennedy governments both supported Diem as leader of South Vietnam despite knowledge of his corrupt and divisive rule</li><li>• Both Eisenhower and Kennedy refused to send ground troops to South Vietnam, preferring to send non-combatant military advisers to aid the South Vietnamese army (ARVN) instead</li><li>• The Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations both provided South Vietnam with economic advisers and vast amounts of economic aid.</li></ul> <p>Arguments and evidence that US policy towards Vietnam under President Eisenhower and under President Kennedy was different should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Eisenhower's experience of conflict in Korea encouraged him to pursue a cautious policy towards intervention; Kennedy's experience of events in Laos and Cuba encouraged him actively to prevent communist advances</li><li>• The Kennedy administration was initially more supportive towards the Catholic, anti-communist administration of Diem than Eisenhower had been</li><li>• In 1963 Kennedy's administration finally came to the realisation that Diem's government was a failure and tacitly supported a coup carried out by ARVN generals in late 1963</li><li>• Faced with increasingly successful guerrilla warfare from the Vietcong, Kennedy came to agree with his Defence Secretary that the Vietnam problem could only be solved by escalating the US military presence</li><li>• Under Kennedy, US policy became more directly active e.g. the provision of US helicopter air support, the use of the Agent Orange, the deployment of Green Beret advisers and support for the strategic hamlets programme.</li></ul> <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>

Question	Indicative content
3	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the suggestion that the most significant consequence of the Tet Offensive for US involvement in Vietnam was the negative effect on public support in the US for the war.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that the most significant consequence of the Tet Offensive for US involvement in Vietnam was the negative effect on public support in the US for the war should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Despite being an overall military failure for the Vietcong, images of Vietcong soldiers in the grounds of the American embassy during the Offensive persuaded many in the US that the Americans were losing</li> <li>• After the Tet Offensive public support for the anti-war movement began to increase, meaning that neither politicians nor military commanders could ignore protests against US involvement any longer</li> <li>• The growth in public protest after February 1968 appeared to encourage the Vietcong and the NVA to believe that they were winning the propaganda battle in Vietnam and to continue their military efforts</li> <li>• News coverage of the Tet Offensive coincided with the removal of graduate deferment from the draft leading to increased protest against the draft and a wider understanding of the consequences of US intervention</li> <li>• Post-Tet public dissatisfaction with the war probably influenced both presidential candidates in the 1968 election, Nixon and Humphrey, to promise that they would find a diplomatic solution to the Vietnam conflict.</li> </ul> <p>Arguments and evidence that the negative effect on public support in the US for the war was not the most significant consequence of the Tet Offensive should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Most Americans still supported US involvement in Vietnam after Tet</li> <li>• The military problems highlighted by Tet meant that US commanders had to admit that there was no end to the conflict in sight e.g. continued US involvement would require the draft of over 200 000 extra troops</li> <li>• The failure of the Tet Offensive undermined the ability of the Viet Cong to continue fighting in the long-term</li> <li>• Politically the events of Tet undermined the confidence of Johnson's administration</li> <li>• The long-term military consequences contributed to President Nixon's decision to extricate the US from Vietnam entirely.</li> </ul> <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>